TY - JOUR
T1 - IOTM
T2 - Iterative Optimization Trigger Method a Runtime Data-Free Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks
AU - Arshad, Iram
AU - Alsamhi, Saeed Hamood
AU - Qiao, Yuansong
AU - Lee, Brian
AU - Ye, Yuhang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Deep neural networks are susceptible to various backdoor attacks, such as training time attacks, where the attacker can inject a trigger pattern into a small portion of the dataset to control the model's predictions at runtime. Backdoor attacks are dangerous because they do not degrade the model's performance. This article explores the feasibility of a new type of backdoor attack, a data-free backdoor. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that require poisoning data and injection during training, our approach, the iterative optimization trigger method (IOTM), enables trigger generation without compromising the integrity of the models and datasets. We propose an attack based on an IOTM technique, guided by an adaptive trigger generator (ATG) and employing a custom objective function. ATG dynamically refines the trigger using feedback from the model's predictions. We empirically evaluated the effectiveness of IOTM with three deep learning models (CNN, VGG16, and ResNet18) using the CIFAR10 dataset. The achieved runtime-attack success rate (R-ASR) varies across different classes. For some classes, the R-ASR reached 100%; whereas, for others, it reached 62%. Furthermore, we conducted an ablation study to investigate critical factors in the runtime backdoor, including optimizer, weight, 'REG,' and trigger visibility on R-ASR using the CIFAR100 dataset. We observed significant variations in the R-ASR by changing the optimizer, including Adam and SGD, with and without momentum. The R-ASR reached 81.25% with the Adam optimizer, whereas the SGD with momentum and without results reached 46.87% and 3.12%, respectively.
AB - Deep neural networks are susceptible to various backdoor attacks, such as training time attacks, where the attacker can inject a trigger pattern into a small portion of the dataset to control the model's predictions at runtime. Backdoor attacks are dangerous because they do not degrade the model's performance. This article explores the feasibility of a new type of backdoor attack, a data-free backdoor. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that require poisoning data and injection during training, our approach, the iterative optimization trigger method (IOTM), enables trigger generation without compromising the integrity of the models and datasets. We propose an attack based on an IOTM technique, guided by an adaptive trigger generator (ATG) and employing a custom objective function. ATG dynamically refines the trigger using feedback from the model's predictions. We empirically evaluated the effectiveness of IOTM with three deep learning models (CNN, VGG16, and ResNet18) using the CIFAR10 dataset. The achieved runtime-attack success rate (R-ASR) varies across different classes. For some classes, the R-ASR reached 100%; whereas, for others, it reached 62%. Furthermore, we conducted an ablation study to investigate critical factors in the runtime backdoor, including optimizer, weight, 'REG,' and trigger visibility on R-ASR using the CIFAR100 dataset. We observed significant variations in the R-ASR by changing the optimizer, including Adam and SGD, with and without momentum. The R-ASR reached 81.25% with the Adam optimizer, whereas the SGD with momentum and without results reached 46.87% and 3.12%, respectively.
KW - Cyber security
KW - data-free backdoor attack
KW - deep learning (DL)
KW - runtime attack
KW - trigger generation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85190172404&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TAI.2024.3384938
DO - 10.1109/TAI.2024.3384938
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85190172404
SN - 2691-4581
VL - 5
SP - 4562
EP - 4573
JO - IEEE Transactions on Artificial Intelligence
JF - IEEE Transactions on Artificial Intelligence
IS - 9
ER -